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In many developing cities, transportation is characterised by disorganised and 
largely unregulated systems where demand clearly outstrips supply. As a result, 
citizens are often left isolated from productive jobs and other valuable amenities 
of urban life. Improving the functionality of these cities is hence often rooted in 
making improvements to transport networks and providing reliable, affordable, 
clean, convenient, and safe access to urban opportunities. With improved 
urban mobility, firms and workers can come together to generate scale and 
specialisation, which in turn, fuels productivity growth. 
The city of Lagos has grappled with transport challenges for many decades. As 
the second largest city in Africa, and the fastest growing megacity in the world, 
government authorities have had to meet consistent pressure to improve the 
quality of existing transport systems while also providing new services that can 
support a larger urban population.1 In response to these demands, the Lagos 
State Government has made a range of large-scale investments in infrastructure 
and public transport over the last 20 years. Most notably, Lagos opened the first 
ever Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system on the African continent in 2008. Today, 
the system boasts two different lines which cover over 35.5 km of track and 
transport over 350,000 commuters on a daily basis.2 
The Lagos BRT and wider transport reforms have helped to transform the 
sprawling and unplanned city, characterised by fragmentation and heavy traffic, 
to a much better example of transport development for liveable and productive 
cities. Through these reforms, Lagos has been able to achieve reductions in 
travel times of up to one-third since 2008, relieving an estimated USD$240M in 
economic loss each year.3 The reforms and their successes were centred around 
five key factors which we will discuss in this case study:
 — Designing organisations for differences: Lagos undertook a radical 
redesign of the organisations governing transport to foster greater 
coordination, accountability and public participation.
 — Establishing financial viability: long-term success was backed by proactive 
plans to improve creditworthiness and financial viability of the transport 
sector.
 — Generating buy-in: contextual awareness and public communication 
proved instrumental in gaining public support for reform.
1  Rosenthal, E. (2012) “Nigeria Tested by Rapid Rise in Population,” The New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an-
overcrowded-planet.html. Earley, K. (2016) “A Tale of Two Megacities - How Shenzhen 
and Lagos Are Coping with Urbanisation,” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/
julius-baer-partner-zone/2016/mar/18/a-tale-of-two-megacities-how-shenzhen-and-lagos-
are-coping-with-urbanisation.
2  Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP 
Discussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.
3  Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) Available at <https://www.theigc.
org/multimedia/ongoing-transport-reforms-city-lagos/>
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 — Demonstrating quick-wins through a project driven approach: 
demonstrating positive transformations in the short-term helped secure 
investor and public support. With the success of each project came further 
stakeholder buy-in, a greater willingness to instigate wider reform, and 
over time, the empowerment of formal institutions.
 — Monitoring performance to meet expected standards: Lagos has shown a 
clear commitment to assessing and achieving results through the BRT and 
subsequent reforms to improve the transport system.
The challenge of urban mobility in Lagos 
Up until the year 2008, Lagos was one of the only major world cities without 
any formalised mass public transit system. Shared transportation was 
predominantly provided by a fleet of 75,000 privately operated minibus services 
(danfos) together with a smaller number of midi-buses (molue), tricycles 
popularly known as keke napep, motorcycle (Okada) and shared-taxis 4. These 
informal minibuses accounted for around 69 percent of all motorised trips back 
in 20085 and were, as they still remain, characterised by their lack of safety 
standards, limited regulation, poor maintenance, poor security and frequent 
violation of traffic laws6. Planted on congested streets with slow speeds and 
highly uncertain commute times, they were not enough to truly transform the 
mobility and efficiency of the city
 û High cost, low-quality service: Almost all of the issues of the danfo and 
molue services are exemplified through their poor-quality infrastructure: 
badly maintained buses, uncomfortable seating arrangements, 
breakdowns, accidents, and few considerations for customers anywhere 
across the system. Couple this with the system’s unreliability and lack 
of regulation, and passengers are left with a low-quality, high-cost 
service. Fares regularly vary depending on the time of day or even on 
weather conditions. For instance, passengers can pay up to nine times  
more between the peak hours of 6:30am-8am compared to at 9am.7 
Furthermore, many of the less profitable routes are underserviced, thus 
leaving many citizens behind. Without any alternative to danfos before 
2008, traffic and transport was highly unpredictable – only serving to 
reinforce poverty. 
 û Lack of safety and security: Accidents and passenger safety have 
been a major concern of informal transport in Lagos, often because 
drivers engage in reckless activities such as speeding, overlapping, and 
4  World Bank. (2016) “Lagos Urban Transport Project” Project Performance Assessment 
Report No.: 103068 Document Date: JUN 30, 2016.
5  LAMATA. (2009)  Final Report—Strategic Transport Master Plan for Lagos 
Metropolitan Area (Lagos: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority, 2009).
6  UN-Habitat. (2012). Enhancing urban safety and security: Global report on human 
settlements 2007. Routledge.
7  This figure is based on an interview with Biodun Otunola who is a transport specialist in 
Lagos. 
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indiscriminate turnings. With no training and little respect for the law, 
drivers regularly risk the safety of their passengers. It is estimated that 
around 2008, there would be 2-3 accidents per week on the danfo system. 
Security is also a major concern across the informal system as they have 
very limited infrastructure in terms of laybys, shelters and designated 
stops. At the same time, there are no trained personel to monitor and 
police activities on the buses, which means they often become havens 
for criminality – putting passengers at the risk of robbery or harassment 
when they travel.
 û Congestion: The carrying capacity of the typical danfo and okada 
minibuses is around 14-18 people, while molue buses can seat 50.8 This 
comparatively low carrying capacity of the danfo, particularly with 
reference to their high-occupany vehicle replacements, which can carry 
30-50 passengers, means their contribution to congestion is much larger. 
While it is not uncommon to see informal providers cramming passengers 
onto buses far beyond their advised carrying capacity, this only further 
propogates the aforementioned issues of safety and poor-quality service.  
In 2008, commuters from the residential areas in the north and west could 
spend over 2 hours in traffic on a one-way journey to work in the city centre 
each day (distances of approximately 20km).9 At the same time, the average 
Lagosian was spending around 40% of their income on transport.10 With 
lower income families often living far from the city centre, this higher but 
unavoidable cost fell disproportionately on them. It was widely recognised 
that improvements to public transportation and traffic management could 
yield significant benefits not just to transport users, but also to the city at 
large. However, as with most reforms, the Lagos State Government faced a 
number of constraints which made the challenge of revamping the transport 
8  Agha, E (2016) Nigeria: Molue – Is Lagos’s King of the Road Going Intro Exctinction 
Avilable at <https://allafrica.com/stories/201605080226.html>
9  Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP 
Discussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.
10  Ibid. N.B. The full fare of travelling 10 kilometres to work on similar systems in many 
cities represents almost a third of incomes for the poorest 20% of low income households. 
Carruthers, R., Malise, D., and Saurkar, A. (2005) “Affordability of Public Transport in 
Developing Countries”. World Bank
Danfo minibuses congest 
the main road in Lagos. 
Image credit: Planet 
Projects Ltd.
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network particularly dauntingLagos needed major capital investments for the 
construction, maintenance and management of a new ‘BRT Lite’11 system and 
all of its requisite infrastructure such as rolling stock, bus terminals, and vehicle 
tracks. We explain the main differences between regular BRT and ‘BRT Lite’ 
in Table 1. These investments in BRT Lite would also require complementary 
changes to regulation, setting in place standards and frameworks such as vehicle 
use, safety and emissions. Initiating such major changes takes a substantial 
amount of time and requires strong political will to keep reform moving 
forwards, coordinating not just the legal and regulatory framework but also 
encouraging behavioural changes across society at large.
Table 1: Differences between regular BRT and ‘BRT Lite’12
Full Systems Lite Systems
 — Specific lanes exclusively 
designated for BRT buses
 — Raised platforms and shelters 
with pre-boarding fare 
collection
 — Advanced technologies to 
manage traffic signalling & 
provide information
 — More efficient and effective but 
at a financial and time cost
 — Partially segregated lanes for 
BRT buses
 — Have simpler bus shelters and 
some collection on buses
 — Less technological intensivity
 — Easier and quicker to 
implement but at the expense 
of efficieny
Despite a strong will for reform in government, there were a number of political 
impediments embedded in the institutional, structural, and socioeconomic 
foundations of the city. Notably, the Lagos State government had to take 
into account the interests of large and powerful groups of informal transport 
providers who stood to potentially lose out with reforms to the system. 
Weaknesses in the incumbent formal institutions for transport meant the 
reforms had to focus on establishing new teams and taskforces to carry out 
the ambitions. This meant taking on a project-driven approach that made 
incremental and manageable changes which could offer demonstrable results in 
the short-term, while looking to build up institutional capacity over the longer 
term on the foundation of successful projects. In the following section, we detail 
the process of Lagos’ transport reforms and some of their key successes. 
11 BRT Lite systems are not designed to meet the highest technical specifications of Bus 
Rapid Transit schemes which would generally entail high-speed, high occupancy vehicles. 
Generally, these systems aim to improve the efficiency of the system through improving 
reliability and frequency of the service and enhancing customer support and commercial 
awareness. This might include changes to the operating environment such as dedicated bus 
lanes, priority signals, parking controls and traffic management. Other typical changes 
include new fare collection and ticketing systems to enhance customer convenience and 
enhanced travel information, better marketing and overall customer care.
12 For more information on BRT systems see Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., 
Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing opportunities: Policy decisions for 
enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf
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Overcoming Lagos’ transport challenge
The turn of the 21st century saw a series of landmark shifts in the Lagos State 
transportation strategy. Governor Tinubu (12th Governor of Lagos State 
1999 – 2007) had recently been elected based on a platform of tax reform and 
infrastructure delivery. Over the course of his term in power, he emphasised 
capital spending on highly visible transport projects, such as roads.13 These 
early reforms focused on making the most of the existing network, emphasising 
spending on maintenance and infrastructure upgrades. At the same time, 
the government made clear efforts to communicate the link between quality 
infrastructure and taxation to the public. The idea was to enhance the social 
contract between state and society, which played an important facilitating role 
for ensuing reforms in the transport sector, such as efforts to improve traffic 
management and compliance. 
Figure 1: Four quadrants of transport reform
• Legal
• Institutional
• Regulatory
Frameworks Infrastructure
Operations &
Maintenance
Finance
• Bus lanes
• Laybys
• Bus stops
• Depots
• Signalling
• Purchase
• Hire
• Lease
• Maintenance
• Subsidies
• Buses
• Fares
• Training
• Intelligent transport
systems
Source: ‘Biodun Otunola’
Over time, however, it became clear that the existing infrastructure was not 
sufficient to truly transform mobility within the city. The longer-term strategy 
had to include the provision of a comprehensive public transport system, 
moving away from the reliance on private motorisation and shared molue and 
danfo buses. Achieving this meant going beyond just delivering the required 
infrastructure and towards recognising the transportation challenge as part 
of an integrated system, in which complementary reforms across sectors and 
policy areas were needed to truly modernise the coordination and delivery of 
transportation. These principles are summarised in Figure 1 which has been the 
13  de Gramont, D. (2015). Governing Lagos: unlocking the politics of reform (Vol. 12). 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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underpinning approach for much of Lagos’ transformation – simultaneously 
focusing on the regulatory frameworks, infrastructure, operations and 
maintenance, and financing of bus reforms.14  
The process of public transport reform
Major reforms often require a shift in political strategy to enable effective 
change. For Lagos’ transport sector, this process was largely kickstarted in 
2000 with the inauguration of the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority 
(LASTMA). LASTMA was mandated by the Lagos State Government to 
improve enforcement of traffic laws, set new standards and rulings, and 
encourage compliance among road users. Although it initially did not include 
any provisions for public transport, its establishment marked a behavioural 
shift within politics and society that collectively strived for better performance 
in urban mobility.
Before LASTMA was established, there had been a wide array of local, state 
and federal government agencies involved in transport provision in Lagos. Most 
operated in siloes, with little regard for the effect their policies had on other 
areas of the system, or even how the decisions of other agencies affected them.15 
Furthermore, they had a tendency to over-rely on infrastructure building, 
neglecting the importance of traffic planning and management. A number 
of studies undertaken in the 1990s – such as the Lagos Mass Transit Study 
(LMTS) – had brought these issues to light, highlighting the fragmentation of 
institutional responsibilities, weaknesses in traffic management, and the lack of 
a cohesive strategy for the city. These studies were used as the basis to justify 
the establishment and responsibilities of agencies like LASTMA. 
While LASTMA helped generate attention towards traffic management, there 
was a clear recognition that Lagos still needed a metropolitan-wide agency 
to encompass all matters of transport policy including and beyond traffic 
management. Subsequently in 2002, the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport 
Authority (LAMATA) was established, taking on principal authority for 
coordinating inter-agency responsibilities, policies and programmes. The 
concept of LAMATA had previously been proposed in the LMTS and 1996 
Detailed Framework for Establishment of LAMATA (DFEL). Influenced by 
Transport for London (TfL), the framework detailed the role, objectives, and 
resource requirements it would need in relation to other transport agencies.16 
The World Bank had also ardently pushed for a dedicated transport authority 
to be set-up. In fact, this was made a requirement for future funding of 
proposed transport reforms during the Lagos Urban Transport projects which 
began in 2000. 
14  This diagram is based on an interview with Biodun Otunola who is a transport 
specialist in Lagos.
15 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758551468288333387/
pdf/418330WP0UNI0A1s0case0dp0501PUBLIC1.pdf 
16 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758551468288333387/
pdf/418330WP0UNI0A1s0case0dp0501PUBLIC1.pdf 
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With LAMATA in operation, it offered the foresight and practical strategy to 
move Lagos out of chaos on the roads and towards a 21st century transport 
system. Through the assistance of the World Bank, LAMATA was able to 
finance the city’s first Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP) in 2005, which 
has since served as the guiding framework for all transport policies up to 2025. 
The plan set ambitions for the city to harness multi-modal transport, predicting 
that by 2025, 60% of travel should be by road, 20% by rail, and 20% by water. 
At the same time, LAMATA would oversee major investments in transport 
infrastructure including the plan’s ambitions to establish 6 BRT lines, 7 rail 
lines, and 6 water transport routes by 2025. 
Table 2: Key stages of reform
Year Lite Systems
2000 Lagos Transport Management 
Authority (LASTMA) inaugurated.
Lagos Urban Transport Projects begin.
Invest in the road network and enforce traffic laws 
and compliance.
2002 Lagos Metropolitan Transport 
Authority (LAMATA) inaugurated.
Policy learning from World Bank.
Establish a metropolitan agency with principal 
responsibility to oversee and coordinate city 
transport policy. LAMATA would be the organisation 
to improve overall functionality, comfort, reliability 
and accessibility of the transport system.
2005 Strategic Transport Master Plan 
(STMP) developed through help of 
World Bank
Guide the development of transportation policies in 
the state until 2025 and set plans to diversify public 
transport modes including BRT, rail, and water 
transport routes.
2006-
2007
Consultations with best-practice in 
other developing cities
First BRT Lite lines operational
State-owned company LAGBUS is 
launched
Policy learning was used to sensitise the powerful 
transport union, showing how things could be 
done in Lagos. This happened in parallel with the 
launch of the BRT and LAGBUS, which offered 
a safer alternative to the informal sector and new 
employment opportunities for workers.
2008 BRT Lite system becomes fully 
operational
To ameliorate the negative consequences of the 
disorganised, fragmented, costly, unsafe, and 
unreliable transport system.
2008- 
2017
Complimentary regulatory reforms 
and infrastructure investments.
Regulations have been implemented to provide for 
several safety standards. New technologies have 
been rolled-out on the bus fleet to improve customer 
experience, and new infrastructure such as junctions, 
bus terminals, shelters, and rail systems have helped 
improve the overall transport system.
2017-
2019
Bus Reform Initiative (2017-2019) Aims to improve the capacity and customer 
experience of the system through: replacement of 
all danfos with HOVs, increased digitatisation of 
the network, improved transport infrastructure, and 
driver training.
LAMATA was able to 
finance the city’s first 
Strategic Transport 
Master Plan (STMP) in 
2005, which has since 
served as the guiding 
framework for all 
transport policies up to 
2025
10 — CITIES THAT WORK
In 2007, the first BRT Lite lines became operational and within one year 
the system was delivered in full and experiencing extremely high demand. A 
number of reforms have taken place since then, including the second wave of 
bus reforms ongoing since 2017. Further detail on these policies are provided in 
the Table 2 and the sections that follow. 
The principles that underlay the effective development of the BRT and other 
public transport reforms focused on five key areas: 
Designing organisations for differences
Delivering reform required a complete redesign of the organisations governing 
transport in Lagos. Significant political and financial backing from top officials 
played a critical role in establishing and maintaining the integrity of the 
ongoing governance changes.17 The creation of LAMATA was undoubtedly 
an instrumental shift towards better coordination of planning, regulation and 
management of transport in the city. As a state government agency, it also 
meant that authorities were held more accountable for their performance. 
Finally, LAMATA’s active public relations strategy and community meetings 
meant citizen engagement became a much stronger norm. 
LAMATA took responsibility for coordinating all of the major stakeholders 
in the transport sector. This helped to integrate the activities of different 
agencies, ensuring they could cooperate effectively based on common objectives. 
Supporting legislation and planning strategies enshrined the particular roles and 
responsibilities of different agencies. It also made clear how each agency could 
leverage one another’s distinct powers to deliver the city’s plan. The following 
are three important examples where inter-agency coordination played a key role 
in the success of the BRT system:
 — Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development: As representatives 
of the state master plan, the Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban 
Development were invited to sit on the BRT Steering Committee. This 
helped the transport authorities access the land on which they needed to 
make infrastructure investments. Furthermore, with proactive planning 
they could also utilise zoning and land-use regulations to more effectively 
ensure high density around the transport nodes. In turn, increased 
ridership on the system would likely improve the financial viability 
of reform.18 Contrasting this with the policy experience in Bogota 
(Colombia), where the BRT was planned and built without amendments 
in the zoning laws around the corridor. As a result, Bogota has not been 
able to capture the full welfare gains from increased land values that may 
have been possible with the construction of their BRT system.19
17  World Bank. (2016) “Lagos Urban Transport Project” Project Performance Assessment 
Report No.: 103068 Document Date: JUN 30, 2016.
18  Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing 
opportunities: Policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: 
https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf 
19  Tsivanidis, N. (2018). The Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Urban Transit 
Infrastructure: Evidence from Bogotá’s TransMilenio. Working Paper, University of Chicago 
Booth School of Business.
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 — Lagos State Traffic Management Authority: It was critical that LAMATA 
had a comprehensive role, both to support the operational systems 
necessary to complement spatial planning and traffic regulation, as well 
as, to take the responsibility for the hard infrastructure. As such, a close 
working relationship with the LASTMA was instrumental to ensure they 
committed resources to protect and improve the BRT.20 This partnership 
enabled effective enforcement of rules. It also meant that there were the 
necessary accompanying investments such as traffic lights, signalling 
systems, or renewal of pinch-point areas on the road network. 
 — Ministry of Public Works and Housing: With the inauguration of LAMATA 
there had to be a transfer of power and control over infrastructure in 
Lagos. This happened in coordination with the Federal Ministry of 
Works and Housing who transferred control of the federal highways – in 
which the BRT system would operate – over to LAMATA, as well as the 
responsibility for financing and constructing the required infrastructure.21 
To operate effectively, these institutions also had to improve internal capacity, 
ensuring they had an adequately trained and motivated staff. The recruitment of 
experienced international staff allowed for policy learning and the creation of 
a strong authority which could move the project from conception to practical 
delivery. Providing an adequate cadre of qualified staff as well as reorganising 
its functions and providing on-going skills training, has been key in ensuring the 
reforms were sustainable over time.
Governor Fashola (13th Governor of Lagos State 2007 – 2015), who succeeded 
Governor Tinubu, also placed a strong emphasis on improving the image 
of the transport authority to make it reflective of a modern-day institution, 
worthy of more positive expectations from international investors and wider 
society. Fashola recognised that to operate effectively, the bus system had to 
be staged with a strong network of trained, committed, and qualified staff 
including drivers, attendants, and back-office operators. Specific funds were 
earmarked for staff training, social support, and uniforms for the drivers, which 
improved career incentives and the dignity of the profession. Tax funds were 
also put aside for the for maintenance and operations of the BRT system which 
generated confidence among private investors to engage more directly in the 
system through public-private partnerships.22
Establishing financial viability
A sustainable BRT system requires a realistic financial strategy from the outset. 
For the early stages of reform, the World Bank had been the principal funder, 
offering financial support for the technical advisory and feasibility work which 
took place during the Lagos Urban Transport Projects and the STMP. However, 
attracting the kind of capital needed to finance the hard infrastructure for the 
20  Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP 
Discussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.
21  Ibid
22  Ibid
Fashola recognised 
that to operate 
effectively, the bus 
system had to be 
staged with a strong 
network of trained, 
committed, and 
qualified staff including 
drivers, attendants, 
and back-office 
operators
12 — CITIES THAT WORK
whole system over the long-term meant the Lagos State government had to 
borrow more. This required demonstrating a capability to handle and repay 
large sums of money to potential investors.
Therefore, one of the initial intentions of the BRT Lite system was to focus 
on delivering results within an agreed upon budget. This was particularly 
relevant as the Lagos State Government was to finance the first line exclusively 
themselves. It was built at an average cost of just $1.7 million per kilometre. 
This is much lower than a similar system that has been proposed in Kampala 
at an estimated cost of USD$17million per kilometre. 23 Even in other cities like 
Bogota and Brisbane, although they have more intricate infrastructure, the BRT 
systems cost around $6 million per kilometre.24
With the BRT operational, Lagos State Government also acted as a financial 
guarantor for the National Union of Transport Workers (NURTW), which 
allowed the NURTW to attract commercial funds for the purchase and 
operation of 100 high capacity buses and lease of a further 120. Members of 
the transport union would then operate these buses on the BRT lanes, where 
they experienced higher rates of ridership, better service delivery, and ultimately 
increased revenue. With that success, the NURTW was able to pay back their 
loans in just two years. At the same time, the Lagos State Government began to 
see large increases in operational revenue through ticket sales and advertising, 
making the scheme widely considered as a financial success.25
Given the positive outcomes of first stages of BRT Lite implementation, 
development finance institutions were much more willing to provide finance for 
the expansion of the BRT as part of the second phase. The principle investors 
were the World Bank and AfDB, who together provided the state loans of 
$190million and $100million respectively.26 Over time, the full 22km BRT 
system in Lagos cost just USD$37.4 million to build, including the cost of 
stations, road partitions and 220 buses. Today, it remains financially sustainable 
to fund operations without subsidies from the national government.27
Encouraging buy in
During the construction of the BRT system there was intense criticism of the 
Lagos State Government by certain interest groups who thought they would 
lose out from the reforms. Private vehicle users felt threatened by the likelihood 
of disrupted traffic. Incumbent minibus operators felt they would be squeezed 
by increased competition. There was even resistance from ordinary residents 
of Lagos who were worried about the possibility of sunk state capital. These 
23  Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing 
opportunities: Policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: 
https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf 
24  Ibid
25  World Bank (2016) “Nigeria. Lagos Urban Transport Project.Project Performance 
Assessment Report.”
26  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)
27  World Bank (2016) “Nigeria. Lagos Urban Transport Project.Project Performance 
Assessment Report.” 
With that success, the 
NURTW was able to 
pay back their loans in 
just two years
Given the positive 
outcomes of first 
stages of BRT Lite 
implementation, 
development finance 
institutions were 
much more willing to 
provide finance for the 
expansion of the BRT 
as part of the second 
phase
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concerns were taken seriously by the state and the success of the BRT can be 
partly attributed to systems being put in place for citizens to express their views 
and have them addressed. 
One of the biggest challenges LAMATA faced in this regard, was 
communicating with the existing bus operators and convincing them to engage 
with the new system. The Lagos State Government therefore embarked on 
extensive negotiations with the politically powerful NURTW. They used these 
negotiations to convince union officials of the widespread benefits of a BRT 
system – in particular, the prospect that BRT could offer direct employment 
via hiring, training and renumerating existing drivers as well as indirect 
employment through enhancing Lagos’ competitiveness. One of the key 
negotiating tools for the state, was that they sponsored visits for the union 
officials to see BRT and other bus services in other international cities, including 
Curitiba (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia). Seeing how such systems had been 
successfully integrated with exisiting bus services elsewhere, helped to persuade 
the NURTW to adopt and franchise the BRT concepts locally, smoothing the 
later transition of existing operators into the formal system.
After the first lines became operational, the following administration under 
Governor Fashola made further provisions to incorporate informal operators. 
Existing operators were encouraged to retrain their staff and it became known 
that the best minibus drivers would be offered a career path in the more 
formalised BRT system. This had the additional benefit that operators of the 
moule and danfo systems were incentivised to improve the overall quality of 
their service delivery so they could compete with the BRT Lite. 
The choice of integrating the incumbent bus services rather than attempting to 
eradicate them proved instrumental in gaining political support for the system 
from local communities. Commuters maintained their flexibility of choice for 
shared transport systems, while some of the more isolated, non-commercial 
routes could still be maintained. In this way, the previous network provided a 
feeder, ‘last mile’ service to routes which the BRT did not cover.
Demonstrating quick wins through a project-driven 
approach
The focus on positive incremental change was at the heart of Lagos’s approach 
to transport reform. In particular, one of the main intentions of implementing a 
BRT Lite system, as opposed to a standard BRT, was to concentrate on essential 
gaps in infrastructure that could be targeted and addressed very quickly. These 
choices for where to focus resources were based on where considerable positive 
change could be made through relatively modest and cost-effective investments. 
Therefore, the investments that were undertaken, prioritised the creation 
of dedicated lanes, bus stops, depots and signalling infrastructure and the 
introduction of reliable services to customers. 
To put some of these infrastructure gaps into perspective, Lagos did not have 
even one single formal bus stop prior to the BRT implementation in 2008. It 
now has approximately 260. Compared to London, where the bus system serves 
roughly half the number of citizens, the city has around 19,000 stops, roughly 
70 times as many than Lagos. By targeting resources towards a clear need in 
Seeing how such 
systems had been 
successfully integrated 
with exisiting bus 
services elsewhere, 
helped to persuade 
the NURTW to adopt 
and franchise the BRT 
concepts locally
The choice of 
integrating the 
incumbent bus services 
rather than attempting 
to eradicate them 
proved instrumental 
in gaining political 
support for the system 
from local communities
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the city, Lagos could build bus stops and curb the irregular stopping patterns 
of danfos, demonstrating a quick improvement to congestion thanks to their 
reform efforts. 
The BRT itself took just 15 months to go from the conception phase to 
having the first line fully operational. Within the first 100 days of operation, 
the system had carried over 9.7 million passengers and within six months of 
operations, it was over 29 million.28 An evaluation by the World Bank in 2009 
suggested that within a year of the operation of the BRT system, over 200,000 
commuters were using it daily, with passengers enjoying a reduction of fares, 
journey time, and an overall increase in quality of service. Short term and 
regular demonstrable improvements were critical in maintaining interest in and 
building support for long-term reform.
28  Ibid
Commuters queue to board 
the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
in 2009. Photo credit: Pius 
Utomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty 
Images.
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Monitoring performance to meet expected 
standards
Apart from the visible successes felt by passengers on a daily basis, it was also 
important to measure the performance of the BRT against the desired objectives 
of the government, as well as the changing needs of the city. Several studies 
have assessed the impacts of the BRT, including both its successes and areas for 
improvement.
Successful outcomes of the BRT reform
 ü Reduced congestion: even though BRT buses only accounted for around 
4% of vehicles on Lagos’ roads in 2009, it has been estimated that across 
the whole transport system, average in vehicle journey times were reduced 
by 40% and average waiting times by 35%.29
 ü Affordability: The Lagos BRT system has been able to maintain affordable 
fees for customers. Following the BRT’s introduction, one off fares in 
Lagos actually decreased by 30 percent, from 140 Naira to 100 Naira,30 
helping to bring-in low-income passenger groups. In the Mile 12 to Ikorodu 
BRT corridor the average monthly spend by individuals on bus travel 
halved.31
 ü Financial Sustainability: Operators can deliver their service without 
relying on financial government assistance. It is self-sustaining even with 
the 30% reduction in fees received by the user.32
 ü Safety benefits: the operation of the BRT and reduction of bad habits 
among danfo operators has contributed to a reduction in accidents from 
139 to 96 accidents per 100,000.33 
 ü Employment: The Lagos BRT reforms generated 2000 direct new 
employment opportunities for drivers, bus conductors, ticket sellers and 
mechanics. Moreover, transferring over to the formal system offered 
operators on the pre-existing danfo services a more stable, formalised 
career path. It is estimated that a further 10,000 jobs were indirectly 
29  Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Transport Policy Program
30  Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Transport Policy Program
31  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)”
32  Omole, D and Ndambuki, J (2014). Sustainable Living in Africa:Case of Water, 
Sanitation, Air Pollution and Energy. Sustainability 6(8), 5187 - 5202
33  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)”
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created through the operation of park and ride facilities as well as food 
services.34 Some estimates indicate that there were socio-economic benefits 
indirectly impacting as many as 500,000 individuals.35 
 ü Environmental benefits: the introduction of the BRT has been associated 
with a reduction in CO2 emissions of 13% and GHG emissions by 20%36, 
benefits that are not only felt by users of the new system, but the wider 
population as well. 
Areas for improvement
 û Demand estimations: the BRT system introduced in 2008, though 
laudable, became over saturated within few months of operation and 
faced a big issue of demand and supply mismatch. Only 100 high floor 
buses were initially available to the NURTW, yet it became apparent 
within the first year of operation that another 200 buses would be 
needed.37 Responsive policymaking allowed some of this demand gap 
to be satisfied through leasing of buses through LAGBUS. However, 
at times many commuters would be stranded because the buses could 
not sufficiently meet the growing demand of the city, particularly at 
peak periods. The experience shows that the need for flexibility and 
contingency in plans to either upscale or downscale in reaction to demand 
is important.
 û Enforcement: enforcing traffic rules and respect for the BRT system 
among private vehicle users has been challenging, particularly because 
the system is only 65% physically segregated from the regular lanes.  As 
a result, private vehicles are still able to drive in BRT lanes, although 
they are not supposed to. Poor policing over vehicles using the lanes has 
therefore impaired the overall speed of the system. 
 û Private car to public transport shift. In 2009, 85% of the clientele using 
the BRT had transferred from previously using danfos, however, due to 
the difficulty in encouraging a private to public shift, only 6% of riders 
had transferred from private cars. Ensuring a high quality customer 
experience has since been an important focus for improvement in order to 
capture higher income transport users.
34  Peltier-Thiberge, N. (2015) “Lagos’ Bus Rapid Transit System: Decongesting and 
Depolluting Mega-Cities” World Bank Group, Transport for Development Blog
35  UNHabitat (2013) “Planning and Design for Sustainable Urban Mobility: Global 
Report on Human Settlements 2013”
36  Peltier-Thiberge, N. (2015) “Lagos’ Bus Rapid Transit System: Decongesting and 
Depolluting Mega-Cities” World Bank Group, Transport for Development Blog
37  Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Transport Policy Program
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Latest efforts to improve the transport system: the Bus 
Reform Initiative (BRI)
In response to these areas for improvement, the Lagos State Government 
recently embarked on an ambitious 3-year Bus Reform Initiative (2017-2019). 
The program is spearheaded by Governor Ambode – building on the work of 
his predecessors Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Fashola – and broadly aiming to 
enhance the customer experience and capacity of the public transport network.
Key elements of the reform include: 
1 Buses: The replacement of all danfos, taking them off the street and in 
their place providing a fleet of 5000 new European standard HOVs and 
Midi-Buses which offer increased safety, reliability and comfort. 820 
buses have so far been procured, 520 of which are HOVs and 300 are 
Midi-buses.
2 Infrastructures: The provision of world-class infrastructure to support 
the transport system. This includes: the completion of remaining BRT 
corridors, road and junction improvement works, as well as 954 new bus 
shelters and lay-bys, 13 new terminals, and 7 depots.
3 Operations: 60 routes will be allocated to qualified bus operating 
companies whose performance will be monitored against set indicators 
for service delivery. By allowing private operators to manage parts of the 
public transport network, the government hopes to improve the capacity 
and overall conditions of the system. 
4 Digitisation: The increased digitisation of the network – including the 
collection and dissemination of real-time service information, smart 
ticketing and ITS-based route allocation.
5 Staff training: Better support and training for drivers and bus attendees, 
including mandatory practical courses to ensure staff are adequately 
certified to operate the bus services. 
We provide some illustrative examples below of how the BRI is has been carried 
forwards in practice. For further details, we refer the reader to the appendix, 
where we provide project and infrastructure specifications that have been part 
of the reform to date, as well as pictures to showcase some of these. 
Infrastructure and operational improvements as part of the 
BRI
The first phase of the BRI commenced in Ikeja in 2018 as critical infrastructures 
such as depots, terminals and dedicated stops were constructed. Such 
infrastructures are to be developed along all of the proposed routes of the 
reform initiative, covering major transport zones including Ikeja, Lagos Island, 
Oshodi and Abule Egba. See Figure 1 in the appendix for a map showing the 
full coverage of the BRI.  
Opearations of the buses then commenced in May 2019 starting with a pilot 
on two major routes between Oshodi-Talafa Balewa Square and Oshodi-Berger.  
Within the first six weeks of operation, from May 2nd to June 23rd, these two 
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routes alone recorded a ridership volume of 84,903 and 75,554 passengers 
respectively, meaning there were roughly 3,700 overall passengers travelling 
from Oshodi per day. Managing this traffic was only made possible because of 
the recent construction of the Oshodi Transport Interchange, one of several new 
infrastructure projects that the reform iniative is putting in place. 
Before Oshodi was constructed, passengers had excessive troubles trying to 
board buses: waiting points were undefined and unstandardized, boarding areas 
were typically congested, and passengers were susceptible to injuries and theft. 
In addition, the state of boarding areas was very poor, passengers had no shelter 
against harsh weather and the waiting environment was typically unclean and 
poorly maintained. However, the construction of the Oshodi terminal, has made 
the environment efficient and more comfortable for all passengers: new state-
of-the-art terminals have shelters where passengers sit comfortably while they 
wait for their buses and designated spaces so passengers can queue in an orderly 
manner as they move into the bus. Moreover, the infrastructure has made a 
transformative difference to the management of vehicular traffic within and 
around the Oshodi terminal.
In parallel, the government has also made efforts to improve the flow of 
traffic across the city through the extensive removal of bottlenecks in the 
road network. Junction improvements, merge and exit lanes, roundabout 
modifications, and pedestrian bridges have all been key areas of focus to 
complement the BRI. One example is the axis connecting Lekki and Victoria 
Island: previously with nine roundabouts between Abraham-Adesanya and the 
Lekki tollgate, citizens could spend as much as three hours travelling between 
the centre and east of the city – a distance of only 18km.38 Since the government 
removed six roundabouts, there has been a 75 percent reduction in traffic time 
and an estimated NRN87billion (~USD$240million)39 saving through reduction 
in fuel costs, environmental costs and lost travel time.
Finally, the government is also opening up new routes for the BRT network 
such as the Oshodi-Abule-Egba corridor. The Oshodi-Abule-Egba corridor is 
currently one of the busiest corridors in West Africa, often experiencing huge 
congestion, particularly during peak periods, where journey time can increase 
38 Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) [Multimedia Item]. London, 
International Growth Centre
39 Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) [Multimedia Item]. London, 
International Growth Centre
Aerial picture of the Oshodi 
Transport Interchange 
before and after new 
construction work. Photo 
credit: Planet Projects Ltd.
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by as much as 400%. Construction of the BRT corridor remains ongoing, with 
operations planned for early 2020, at which point it is expected that the BRT 
corridor will carry over 300,000 passengers daily across a 13km stretch.
These efforts intend to enhance the overall quality, efficiency and reliability of 
the bus network, changing the public perspective and strengthening trust in the 
system.
In summary
The Lagos transport reforms highlight that with the right motivation, 
dedication and leadership it is possible to achieve striking results. Since the 
implementation of the BRT, the city has seen remarkable improvements across 
a number of indicators that impact upon the everyday lives of citizens. We 
summarise a few of the key highlights in the Table 3. 
Table 3: Lagos’s pre and post reform transport performance
Pre-reform Post-reform
Transport cost Average 140 Naira Decreased 30% - 50%
Congestion Very high Reduction in travel times of 40%
Greenhouse gas emissions High Decreased 13% - 20%
Safety 139 accidents per 100,000 Decreased 30%
Comfort levels Low Wide felt improvements
Other benefits Direct & indirect employment, security of travel.
Several features of the reforms are important to consider for replication in 
other cities. Firstly, policy learning from abroad was combined with a strong 
knowledge of the city context. Solutions were tailored towards integrating 
society and the danfo-dominated network rather than excluding it from 
the decision-making process. Secondly, establishing a strong institutional 
foundation for project coordination and setting the strategic plan was critical 
to the long-term success of reform. Lastly, utilising the incremental approach 
allowed the state to make quick, cost-effective and visible wins that were 
witnessed by everyday citizens. These characteristics proved instrumental to the 
successes of the Lagos transport reforms.
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Appendix
In the sections below, we provide details of the coverage and infrastructures in 
the Lagos Bus Reform Initiative. This information is from Planet Projects Ltd, a 
Nigerian company that has been closely involved in the strategic planning and 
implementation of various transport improvements in Lagos including the BRI. 
Coverage of the Bus Reform Initiative
Figure 2: Map of Lagos Bus Reforms – Phase 1A
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As part of the planning and implementation of the BRI, Lagos was divided into 
five strategic transport zones in which targeted solutions could be made based 
on the specific transport challenges of each area. These zones include: 
 — Zone 1A: Ikeja;
 — Zone 1B: Lagos Island;
 — Zone 2A: Oshodi;
 — Zone 2B: Oshodi-Abule-Egba; 
 — Zone 3: Strategic Linkages.
Figure 2 provides a map of Phase 1 of the bus reforms initiative, showcasing the 
routes and locations of proposed infrastructures.
Bus specifications:
5,000 new buses (HOVs and Midi Buses) will be deployed to the public 
transport route to replace the danfos. These buses provide more comfort, with 
amenities like charging points and free Wi-Fi, for enhanced user experience and 
increased ridership. The bus specifications are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Summary of Bus Specifications (HOV and Midi-buses)
S/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)
1. Configuration and Size 2-Axle Single Deck, 
- HOV: Length 12m – 13m, Width 2.4m – 2.55m 
Midi-bus: Length 7m – 11m, Width 2.2m – 2.4m
2. Ground Clearance 150mm – 450mm
3. Seating Capacity HOV 40 - 50 Passengers, 
Midi-bus: 27 – 33 Passengers
2x2 Distribution, Vinyl Seat Covers
4. Standing Capacity HOV 30 - 45 Passengers, 
Midi-bus: 10 – 20 Passengers
5. Passenger Door 
Numbers
2 Double Leaf Pneumatically Operated Doors
Door Release Valve For Emergency Exit
Manual Ramp For Wheelchair Access
6. Passenger Door 
Positions
Ahead Of Front Axle
Ahead Of Rear Axle
7. Ventilation And Climate 
Control
Fully Air Conditioned
Sliding Windows, Tinted Glasses With UV Filtering and Heat 
Insulation
Roof Hatches with 4 opening positions and emergency exit
8. Suspension 
Configuration
Air Suspension 
Kneeling Suspension
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S/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)
9. Steering Configuration Left Hand Drive with integrated power steering
Steering Column with pneumatic height and titlt adjustment
10. Braking System Self-Adjusting Braking System (Slack Adjuster, Automatic)
Drum Brake
Exhaust Brake Control, Automatic
Retarder
11. Power-Plant Location Centrally And Longitudinally Rear
12. Engine HOV: 5-Cylinder, In-Line, Direct Injection, Turbo-Charge,   250hp
Midi-bus: 4-Cylinder, In-Line, Direct Injection, Turbo-Charged, 
150hp
13. Power-Plant Fueling Automotive Gas Oil (Diesel)
14. Exhaust Emission 
Standards And 
Treatments
Euro Ill, with Diesel Particulate Filter
Exhaust Catalysts
Fuel Cooler
Centrifugal Oil Cleaner
15. Transmission Type Automatic 6-Speed Transmission
16. Windscreen Front – 2piece Green Laminated Glass [ECE-R 43]
Rear – 1 Piece Green Laminated Glass
17. Destination Signs Electronic – LED
Exterior And Interior 
18. Electrical System Alternator – 2x 100A
Batteries – 2x225AH (HOV), 2x150AH (Midi-bus), Maintenance 
Free
19. Fuel Tank Internally Coated
Minimum 300 Liters Capacity with preferably 2 Filling Points
Anti- Siphon Device Fitted
20. Front Axle 
Rear Axle
HOV: 7 Tonnes; Midi-bus: 3 tonnes 
HOV: Minimum 12 Tonnes; Midi-bus: 6 tonnes
21. Body And Flooring Full Body Frame Insulation With Injected Polyurethane
Overall Anticorrosion Treatment On Body Frame
Fiberglass And Aluminum Body
Flooring – Marine Plywood, 14mm Thickness
Flooring Covered With Heavy Duty Synthetic Material
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S/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)
22. Interior Accessories 1 nos. 6kg Fire Extinguisher – Driver’s Compartment
1 Set Of Triangular Early Warning Device
1 Box Of First Aid Kit
4 Pieces Of Hammers For Breaking Windows In Case Of An 
Emergency
Windscreen Roller Blind
Passenger Bells With Buzzer And Warning On The Driver’s 
Dashboard
PA System
Tool Box
Entertainment System (Dvd and Radio) With Speakers On Parcel 
Rack
23. Additional 
Requirements
Driver’s enclosure 
Tropicalisation of engines minimize engine overheating issues
Speed limiting device
Warranty 5-years rust free on body frame
Electronic Ticketing Machine ready
Turnstiles at entry and exit points
GPS enabled
CCTV with minimum of 4 cameras for exterior and interiors views
Hub odometers
Customized operator logo
Workshop and operation manuals
3-years warranty or 150,000km whichever comes first
Provision of factory and local technical training
Setup and initial managing of central workshops
Provision of recommended fast moving spare part list with part 
numbers for 3 years with fixed prices
Existing or ability to setup Bus Manufacturing Assembly Plant in 
Lagos, Nigeria within specified timeframe.
USB charging point at all passengers’ seats and In-bus Wi-Fi 
coverage
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Infrastructure Projects Status
Table 2 provides a description of the various infrastructures that are included in 
Phase 1 of he BRI and their delivery status.
Table 5: Status of Phase 1 Infrastructure Delivery
S/No. Infrastructure Completed On-going Remaining balance
1. Buses 820 (HOV – 520, 
Midi-bus – 300)
- 4,180
2. Depots 2; Yaba & Oshodi 1; Anthony 4
3. Bus Shelters 100 - 854
4. Bus Terminals 3; TBS, Ikeja, Oshodi 6; Yaba, Ojota, Agege, 
Oyingbo, NAHCO, 
Ajah
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5. Junction Improvement 
Works (JIW)
- Ongoing -
6. Intelligent Transport 
System
- Ongoing -
Lagos Bus Reforms Buses – 
HOV bus
Lagos Bus Reforms Buses – 
HOV bus
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The images below provide visuals of some of the infrastructures and their 
associated impacts.
3D architectural plan of 
the Oshodi Transport 
Interchange
Aerial picture of the 
completed Oshodi 
Transport Interchange
Aerial picture of the Oshodi 
Bus Depot
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Yaba Bus Terminal (currently 
under construction)
Yaba Bus Depot
Tafawa Balewa Square Bus 
Shelters
Typical Bus Station & Lay-by
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Ikeja Bus Terminal – Before 
& After
Ikeja Bus Terminal
Waiting points (before and 
after)
Boarding process (before 
and after)
Passenger comfort during 
transit (before and after)
Environmental conditions 
(before and after)
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economic research with the knowledge of urban planning practitioners and 
policymakers. It is led by Paul Collier (Oxford University), Yvonne Aki Sawyer 
(Mayor of Freetown), Edward Glaeser (Harvard University), Astrid Haas (IGC), 
Naison Mutizwa-Mangiza (Director Regional Office for Africa, UN-Habitat), 
Jonathan Leape (IGC), Jennifer Musisi (Executive Director of Kampala Capital 
City Authority) and Tony Venables (Oxford University).  
Please contact us at citiesthatwork@theigc.org.
Please cite the contents of this document as follows:  
Otunola, B., Kriticos, S., and Harman, O. (2019) The BRT and the danfo:  
A case study of Lagos’ transport reforms from 1999-2019. IGC Cities that 
Work Case Study.
